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Abstract 
 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a way of 
reorganizing software infrastructure into a set of 
service abstracts. In the area of applying SOA to Web 
Service Security, there have been some well defined 
security dimensions. However, current Web Security 
Systems, like WS-Security are not efficient enough to 
handle Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.  
Our new approach, Service Oriented Traceback 
Architecture (SOTA), provides a framework to be able 
to identify the source of an attack. This is 
accomplished by deploying our defence system at 
distributed routers, in order to examine the incoming 
SOAP messages and place our own SOAP header.   By 
this method, we can then use the new SOAP header 
information, to traceback through the network the 
source of the attack. According to our experimental 
performance evaluations, we find that SOTA is quite 
scaleable, simple and quite effective at identifying the 
source.          
 
Index Terms— Traceback, Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA), Service-Oriented Computing 
(SOC), Distributed Denial of Service, XDoS 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) is today’s 
solutions for developing web services. By utilising web 
services, organizations expose their core elements over 
the Internet via the use of Extensible Markup 
Language (XML). This had lead corporations and 
businesses in general, to earn huge profits. One of the 
most serious threats to these organizations, comes in 
the form of a Denial-of-Service (DoS) and its larger 
counterpart Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) 
attack [5][6]. The two main objectives of these attacks 
are, to exhaust computer resources (CPU time, 
Network bandwidth) so that it makes services 
unavailable to legitimate users. The second objective, 
is to hide their identity by mimicking legitimate web 
service traffic, in order to create a large group of agents 
to launch an attack [9][12].  
These types of attacks, at least 4000 according to the 
Prolexic Zombie Report 2007, happen on a daily basis 
[17]. Some of the reasons why a person would use a 
DoS or DDoS attacks are, competitive advantage [7], 
extortion of online business [8] and Employee 
Vilification [9]. Some recent DDoS attacks brought 
down the C-Gold Chat Forum website [10] and SE-
NSE Forums [11].  
 
Current security for Web Services using the Service-
Oriented Architecture (SOA) encompasses the areas of 
integrity, confidentiality and availability [1][2]. Any 
breaches or violation on these areas is considered an 
attack on the network. Some of the most important 
specifications that address web service security are 
WS-Security [3], XML-Signature [13] and XML-
Encryption [14].  These standards work in conjunction 
with Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [4] 
specifications, in order to provide web service security 
regardless of the transport protocol. Some of the web 
security applications that employ this specification are, 
WS-Security and Security Assertions Markup 
Language (SAML) [15][16].  
In this paper, our contribution is to adopt a product-
neutral approach, in order to prevent DDoS and XML 
based DoS (XDoS) attacks on web services. Based on 
our observations of current web security services, new 
enhancements are needed to handle the current flow of 
attacks on web services. We propose a Service 
Oriented Traceback Architecture (SOTA) framework, 
to leverage existing security infrastructure. The 
framework provides a way to enable a traceback 
through the system, in order to identify the true identity 
of the attack. Upon the discovery of this identity, 
appropriate preventive mechanisms can be triggered, 
updating your firewall to filter the traffic for example. 
The remainder of this paper is made up of as follows. 
Section 2, covers the related work on web security 
services and IP traceback.  The details of our SOTA 
framework are introduced in Section 3. Section 4, we 
present our experiments and performance evaluation 
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and Section 5, provides our conclusion and future 
work.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
With the severity of DDoS attacks occurring on a 
daily basis [10][11][17], attackers have discovered how 
simple and easy it is to disrupt web services. In this 
section we briefly cover current Web Security systems 
and there problems in dealing with DDoS. Lastly, IP 
traceback methods are covered.  
 
2.1. WS-Security 
 
One of the most important providers of security, in 
regards to web services, is WS-Security. WS-Security 
collaborates with SOAP specifications, in order to 
extend a SOAP message, by placing a so-called 
security header into it. This header is made of parts that 
have been defined by WS-Security Policy [18]. 
Through this policy, the web security services of 
integrity, confidentiality and authentication are defined 
and agreed upon by client and server. WS-Security 
employs the use of XML Signature and XML 
encryption. With their use, an encrypted XML 
fragment is placed inside the SOAP header, which 
provides security for the data to remain confidential. 
Based on our observations, we see little compatibility 
between the objectives of DDoS attack (Deprive 
legitimate users and cover the tracks of the attacker) 
and security protection provided by WS-Security 
(Protect SOAP message content).  To further our 
claim, we can demonstrate a very simple way of how 
an attacker can get around WS-Security. One of the 
ways an attacker can cover their identity is by stealing 
a known legitimate user’s id (Spoofing). With this 
spoofed message, the attacker can send an oversize 
message to crash the server, or just simply keep 
pumping the messages to the victim until their server 
crashes due to congestion [19].  
 
2.2. IP Traceback   
 
IP traceback schema can be categorized into two 
main areas, proactive and reactive [21]. Reactive 
traceback respond to an attack instead of trying to 
prevent the attack. This means it must be active while 
the attack is going on, otherwise it can not react to a 
DDoS attack. Link testing methods such as Control 
flooding [22] and Input debugging [23] are examples 
of reactive schemas. One of the problems with reactive 
schemas is that they require ISP co-operation for them 
to work, which most are reluctant to do, due to 
competitive reasons. In contrast, proactive schemas are 
actively recording trace information as packets 
transgress the network. With the recording 
information, the victim can reconstruct the path the 
packets had taken and subsequently identify the source 
of the attack. Some examples of proactive schemas 
include messaging [24][25], logging [26][27] and 
packet marking [28][29]. The problem with proactive 
schemas is that they require a great deal of resources to 
be committed to record and store the collected data. 
This makes them complex, complicated and redundant 
to use, especially if each router or server is required to 
log mostly the same information.   
 
3. SOTA Framework 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Service-Oriented Traceback Architecture (SOTA) 
main objective is to apply a SOA approach to 
traceback methodology, in order to identify the true 
source of a DDoS. SOTA is based upon a popular form 
of packet marking called Deterministic Packet Marking 
(DPM) [30]. DPM is a packet marking algorithm that 
marks the ID field and reserved flag within the IP 
header. As each incoming packet enters an edge 
ingress router it is marked, outgoing packets are 
usually ignored. The marked packets will remain 
unchanged for as long as the packet traverses the 
network. We propose, in a SOTA framework, to 
employ some of the DPM methodology by placing our 
own Service-Oriented Traceback Mark (SOTM) within 
a web service message. If current web security services 
are being employed already, SOTM will replace the 
‘token’ that contains the client identification with its 
own. The SOTM tag contains the real source 
identification, which is then placed inside the SOAP 
message, as the message enters the edge router. This 
tag will not change as it traverses through the network.  
With this SOTM tag, the victim of a DDoS attack will 
be able find the true source of the DDoS attack and 
filter it.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. SOTA from the network service prospective  
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Figure 2. Web Service Architecture without SOTA  
 
Figure 3. Web Service Architecture with SOTA defence 
system 
 
3.2. SOTA Description  
 
SOTA is deployed at the edge routers in order to be 
closer to the source end of the network. Figure one 
gives a network service display of where SOTA is 
placed. Usually if no security services are in place for 
web services, as seen in figure 2, then the system is 
quite vulnerable to attacks.  SOTA remedy’s this by 
being located before the Web Server, figure 3, in order 
to place a SOTM tag within the SOAP header. This is 
accomplished by attaching the Web Service Definition 
Language (WSDL) to SOTA instead of the web server. 
As a result, all service requests are first sent to SOTA 
for marking.  Some of the consequence of placing 
SOTA before the web server are, we effectively 
remove the service providers address and prevent a 
direct attack.  If an attack is discovered or was 
successful at bringing down the web server, the victim 
will be able to recover the SOTM tag and reconstruct 
where the attack came from.  
In an attack scenario, the attack client will request a 
web service from SOTA, which in turn will pass the 
request to the web server. The attack client will then 
formulate a SOAP request message based on the 
service description formulated by WSDL. Upon receipt 
of SOAP request message, SOTA will place a SOTM 
within the header. We assume that WS-Security 
services are not being used. Otherwise the SOTM 
would replace the ‘wsse’ username tag with its own 
username tag. Once the SOTM has been placed, the 
SOAP message will be sent to the Web Server. Upon 
discovery of an attack, the victim will ask SOTA 
 
Figure 4. SOTA attached to the BPEL process  
 
reconstruction to extract the mark and inform them of 
the message origins and begin to filter out the attack 
traffic. If the message is normal, the SOAP message is 
then forwarded to the request handler for processing. 
Upon the receipt of the SOAP request the Web Service 
will prepare a SOAP response. The Web Server then 
takes the SOAP response and sends it back to the client 
as part of the HTTP response.  SOTA will not interfere 
with response requests or any outgoing message. 
A practical example of where SOTA can be applied 
is the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) 
[21] process. BPEL, is the favourite candidate for 
becoming the predominant of the Web Service 
composition standards. Figure 4 gives a display of 
BPEL process with the implementation of the SOTA 
framework system. SOTA reconstruction (SOTA 
RECO) is located at between the port and BPEL 
process in order to reconstruct the path back to the 
attack client. 
3.2.1 SOTA approach to SOA 
SOTA has the number of basic properties and 
characteristics of the service model [31]. These 
characteristics are as follows [32]: 
• Loosely Coupled – SOTA is made from the XML 
base language. This means that it can be run on 
different platforms regardless of the programming 
language.  
• Message based interaction – The interaction 
between the client, SOTA, and service provider 
are all message based.  
• Dynamic Discovery – WSDL is attached to SOTA 
so that all services are known to the public. This 
means that any client can connect to SOTA at any 
time over the internet and access the services of 
the service provider.  
• Late Binding – SOTA and the service provider all 
run in real-time. This allows clients to access 
services when and wherever they are.  
• Policy based behaviour – We plan to implement 
our own policy called SOTA-Policy, in the future, 
which will follow the WS-Security Policy. This 
policy will dictate messages marking procedures.  
SOTA acts like a service broker within a SOA model 
(see figure five). Service Brokers are a repository for 
service descriptions, such as WSDL or Universal 
Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI). 
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Figure 5. SOA diagram with SOTA as the Service 
Broker 
 
Figure 6. Mini-SOTA  
 
3.3 Alternative SOTA  
 
Figure 3 shows the main SOTA used in this paper as 
a Monolithic structure. An alternative approach is 
shown in Figure 6 using mini SOTA. Mini SOTA can 
be created with its own WSDL. WSDL is used to 
broadcast to the public what services are available and 
can be requested. Mini SOTA can allow service 
providers the option of splitting their services into 
different categories. This would make for a more 
efficient and effective use of service resources. 
Services that are categorized make it simple and easy 
for service providers to find a particular service. 
Searching for a particular service in a mini WSDL 
would be relatively easy instead of one monolithic 
WSDL.  
 
4. Performance Evaluation 
 
4.1. Simulation Setup  
4.1.1 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made about SOTA: 
• It is assumed that an attacker may control any 
number of client machines that are widely 
distributed across the Internet.  
• It is further assumed that attackers might know 
that they are being traced.  
• It only takes a few messages to get to the SOTA 
reconstruction for a traceback to begin. SOTA 
has not itself been compromised by the 
attackers.  
 
 
Figure 7. Pseudo Code to extract Header information  
 
Figure 8. Pseudo Code to extract, store and display 
username identification 
 
• That the service provider of Web Service has 
limited resources.  
• SOAP headers are being used by the Client.  
4.1.2 Header Format for SOTM 
After SOAP message has been re-formatted, the 
SOAP header information regarding identification is 
extracted from the message, Figure 7. If there is no 
SOAP header, then a header is created with the client 
identification attached. Once the header has been 
created or updated the message is forwarded to the 
Web-Server.    
4.1.3 ID reconstruction 
 
SOTA reconstruction is to handle the reconstruction 
of the path back to the true source of the message. 
Also, SOTA reconstruction is given instruction by the 
service provider at the time of the attack or at the end 
to start the reconstruction process. The information that 
is extracted, should lead to the source of the message 
attack and initiation of protection measures, such as 
telling the firewall to block message from that 
particular client for example. Figure 8 displays the 
pseudo code that extracts the SOAP header information 
and stores the information in a table array. 
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Figure 10. Results of WS-Security, SOTA(exchange) 
and SOTA(WS-Security) 
 
4.2 Evaluation  
 
Experiments were carried out to evaluate the 
performance of the SOTA system. A Dell Dimesion 
DM501 Intel Pentium single-core CPU, 3.0 GHz, 2 GB 
of RAM and 2 300GB SATA hard-drives was used for 
our experiments.  All our programs were implemented 
with .NET Web Services with the use of VB and ASP 
high-level language. In our first experiment we 
developed a basic SOAP Web Service using the 
ASP.net Web Services. The program contained a basic 
header for authentication purposes. 
To simulate SOTA, the program extracts from the 
header the name id and replaces it.  It is assumed that a 
one-way transmission delay between client and Web 
Server is 10ms. This delay is simulated by the program 
going into a wait mode for 10ms before a message is 
sent to the web-server again. It is further assumed that 
SOTA is on the same tier as the Web-Server instead of 
being in front of the Web-Server to protect it. The 
measurements in this experiment represent the 
processing time over the response time of each 
message that was sent to the Web-Server and to SOTA. 
Figure 9 shows the results of the experiment. The 
results show that it took more then 2 secs of processing 
time. This shows that SOTA is far more efficient and 
effective then the authentication procedure. SOTA in 
this experiment only had to replace the id within the 
header while authentication had to process and verify 
the identification. One of the reasons for SOTA being 
able to respond quicker to the messages than SOAP 
authentication is that the service provider only has to 
access SOTA if they want to know the true source of 
where the message came from. Having the extra 
response time to process messages will cut down the 
load on computer resources during a DDoS and XDos.     
In our second experiment we run a WS-Security 
interaction application against Amazon Elastic 
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) [33] SOAP service. 
The WS-Security application contained a signed 
certificate for authentication purposes. SOTA in this 
experiment was to exchange the username id name for 
the authentication name before it was sent to the 
Amazon SOAP service. This was to ensure that no 
errors were to occur during the experiment. The results 
are based on how long the applications had taken to 
process, and how quickly the response came back from 
Amazon. SOTA can be used in conjunction with WS-
Security in order to re-place the name id for the real-
source id. The results show in figure 10 that when 
SOTA is introduced to WS-Security an increase in the 
response time is around thirty percent. The increase in 
response time means that during a DDoS attack more 
processing time is required to handle the extra burden. 
The advantage with this increase is that the true 
identification of the source of the attack will most 
likely be identified. WS-Security compared to SOTA 
[SOTA (exchange)] is over double the response time. 
WS-Security had to build a security token before the 
message was sent to the Amazon Web Server. On 
receipt of the token, Amazon can test the 
authentications of the message. However, SOTA only 
has to place or exchange the identification information.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This paper proposes a framework for identifying the 
real source of XDoS and DDoS attacks. SOTA is a 
traceback system that is constructed on the basis of 
Web Services. Loose Coupling, Policy Based, Message  
Based and Dynamic discovery are some of criteria 
employed by the SOTA framework. The empirical data 
from our experiments shows, that SOTA is efficient 
and effective at being able to traceback, to the source 
the real identity of XDoS and DDoS attack on Web 
Services. Once an attack has been discovered and the 
identity known then counter measures can be initiated. 
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